Is education a fundamental right? People's lay theories about intellectual potential drive their positions on education by Savani, K et al.
Savani, K; Rattan, A; Dweck, C S, Is Education a Fundamental Right? People’s Lay Theories 
About Intellectual Potential Drive Their Positions on Education, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin (43, 9) pp. 1284-1295. Copyright © 2017 (Sage). Reprinted by permission 
of SAGE Publications. Final version available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217711935 
 
 
 
 
Is Education a Fundamental Right? People’s Lay Theories About Intellectual 
Potential Drive Their Positions on Education 
 
Krishna Savani 
Nanyang Technological University 
 
Aneeta Rattan 
London Business School 
 
Carol S. Dweck 
Stanford University 
 
March 28, 2016 
 
Word count = 9265 
IS EDUCATION A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?  2 
Abstract 
Does every child have a fundamental right to receive a high quality education? We 
propose that people’s beliefs about whether “nearly everyone” or “only some people” 
have high intellectual potential drive their positions on education. Three studies found 
that the more people believed that nearly everyone has high potential, the more they 
viewed education as a fundamental human right. Further, people who viewed education 
as a fundamental right, in turn, (1) were more likely to support the institution of free 
public education; (2) were more concerned upon learning that students in the country 
were not performing well academically compared to students in peer nations; and (3) 
were more likely to support redistributing educational funds more equitably across 
wealthier and poorer school districts. The studies show that people’s beliefs about 
intellectual potential can influence their positions on education, which can affect the 
future quality of life for countless students. 
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Is Education a Fundamental Right? Lay Theories About Intellectual Potential 
Drive People’s Positions on Education 
Without education, people all over the world may have little hope of improving 
their social position or life outcomes. Because people with more education have higher 
incomes (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013), are happier (Pinquart & Sorensen, 2000), 
have better physical health (Adler et al., 1994), and live longer (Lleras-Muney, 2005; 
Miech, Pampel, Kim, & Rogers, 2011), the question arises: Do all people have a 
fundamental right to a high quality education? This question is all the more pressing 
given that to be successful in the increasingly global, high-technology economy, 
individuals need to be highly skilled and able to innovate (Hanushek & Woessmann, 
2008; Trani & Holsworth, 2010), both of which are nearly impossible to achieve if people 
do not receive a high-quality education.  
In this article, we argue that people’s lay theories about intellectual potential drive 
their positions on education. Lay theories are people’s naïve assumptions about the 
nature of different characteristics (Dweck, 2000). People’s lay theories about intellectual 
potential refer to their beliefs about the distribution of intellectual potential (the capacity 
to exhibit high intelligence) across the population (Rattan, Savani, Naidu, & Dweck, 
2012). Some believe that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential (the universal 
belief). Others believe that only some people have high intellectual potential (the 
nonuniversal belief).  
Past research on this lay theory has demonstrated individual and cultural 
differences in people’s beliefs about whether nearly everyone or only some people 
possess high intellectual potential (Rattan et al., 2012). For example, in both the US and 
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India, some people view intellectual potential as universal and others as nonuniversal. 
Further, on average, US Americans are more likely than South Asian Indians to believe 
that intellectual potential is nonuniversal. After identifying these cross-national 
differences, past research explored a consequence of these lay theories within the US: 
people who believed that only some individuals have high intellectual potential were 
less willing to address existing inequity in how educational funds are distributed across 
school districts (e.g., schools in richer districts receiving much more educational funding 
than schools in poorer districts). In contrast, people who believed that nearly everyone 
has high intellectual potential were more likely to support reallocating educational 
funding more evenly across schools in wealthier and poorer school districts (Rattan et 
al., 2012).  
Although this past work identified a new dimension on which people’s beliefs 
about intellectual potential vary, and identified how people’s beliefs on this dimension 
influence their support for reducing inequity in the context of school funding, the 
research did not identify the underlying mechanism explaining this relationship. That is, 
researchers have not addressed the more basic question of why people who believe 
that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential support reallocating educational 
funding more equitably across wealthier and poorer school districts. Because of this, it 
is unclear in what other ways people’s beliefs about intellectual potential might influence 
their attitudes about education. The current research seeks to address both of these 
questions. We propose (a) that people’s beliefs about whether nearly everyone or only 
some people have high intellectual potential will influence whether or not they view 
education as a fundamental human right, and (b) that their policy attitudes will follow 
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from this construal of education.  
Construing education as a right 
We propose that people’s beliefs about intellectual potential would influence their 
positions on whether or not education is a basic right. We theorize that all people want 
individuals with high intellectual potential to actualize their potential, and educational 
opportunity is the means to achieve this end. For people who believe that nearly 
everyone has high intellectual potential, this line of reasoning applies to virtually 
everyone; thus, we predict that these people will tend to view education as a 
fundamental human right. For people who believe that only certain individuals have high 
intellectual potential, however, this line of reasoning only applies to a portion of the 
population; thus, we predict that these people will be less likely to view education as a 
fundamental right.  
If people’s beliefs about intellectual potential influence the extent to which they 
view education as a right, they might also (indirectly) influence people’s attitudes about 
educational practices and policies more generally. We propose that if people view 
education as a fundamental human right, in turn, (1) they would want to support the 
institution that can help deliver this right—free and compulsory, publicly supported 
education; (2) they would be more concerned if students in the country are not 
performing well academically, because it means that their right to education is not being 
realized; and (3) they would want to rectify inequity in education, because fundamental 
rights should be equally available to everyone. We discuss each of these education 
policies below. 
 Support for public investment in education. The question of whether public 
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investment in education ought to be maintained is a critical issue facing education today 
(Ravitch, 2014). If people who believe that nearly everyone has high intellectual 
potential view education as a fundamental right, they might see collectively funded 
public education as a means for allowing everyone to realize their right to education. In 
contrast, if people who believe that only some people have high intellectual potential do 
not view education as a right, they might be more open to reducing the public’s 
investment in education. Thus, we hypothesize that through the construal of education 
as a right, a universal intellectual potential belief would increase people’s support for 
public education. As long as free, publicly supported education remains as one of the 
defining institutions of modern civil society in the US and many other countries, 
understanding people’s mindsets that increase or decrease their support for this 
institution is of paramount theoretical and practical importance.  
Concern with poor educational outcomes. In addition to examining people’s 
support for continued public investment in education, we investigated how concerned 
people are when they learn that students in the country, on average, are not performing 
very well academically. Recent statistics show that US American students’ educational 
performance lags behind that of students in most other industrialized nations. For 
example, on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the 
international standard for comparing students’ educational outcomes across nations, US 
students scored below average in math literacy (30th among 54 nations) and about 
average in science (23rd) and reading literacy (20th) (OECD, 2013). We reasoned that if 
people believe that nearly all students have high intellectual potential, then they might 
infer that if students in the country are not doing well academically, it is likely because 
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students are not receiving a good enough education, which means that their right to 
education is going unfulfilled. Therefore, we predicted that the more people believe that 
everyone has high intellectual potential, and therefore, the more they view education as 
a right, the more disturbed they would be upon learning that students in the US are not 
performing well academically.  
Support for distributing educational resources more evenly. Support for 
public investment in education and concern about students’ poor academic outcomes 
are two aspects of people’s broader support for public education that we investigate for 
the first time in this paper. Yet, at the outset of this paper, we theorized that people’s 
construal of education as a right is the mechanism explaining why people’s universal-
nonuniversal beliefs relate to their attitudes about education policy, including people’s 
attitudes about redistributing educational funds more equitably across wealthier and 
poorer school districts (Rattan et al., 2012). We reasoned that this would be the case 
because if people who believe that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential view 
education as a fundamental right that is equally applicable to everyone, then they are 
likely to believe that each person deserves an equal investment in their education—only 
then would every person have the same opportunity to realize their right and their 
inherent intellectual potential. Therefore, we tested whether people’s view of education 
as a right would mediate the relationship between their beliefs about intellectual 
potential and the extent to which they support redistributing educational funds.  
Lay theories about the malleability of intelligence 
Although our focus in the current work is on people’s beliefs about whether 
everyone or only some people have high intellectual potential, extensive previous 
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research has studied whether people believe that intelligence cannot be changed (a 
fixed mindset) or can be grown and developed over time (a growth mindset; Dweck, 
1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Theoretically, people’s beliefs about whether 
intelligence is fixed or can be developed do not necessarily constrain their beliefs about 
whether nearly everyone or only some people have high intellectual potential. For 
example, some people might believe that people’s intelligence is fixed, and that nearly 
everyone has a fixed high level of intelligence. It is simply the case, they may believe, 
that not everyone has had the chance to draw out or capitalize on their existing 
intellectual potential. We would say that these people hold a combination of the fixed 
mindset and the universal belief. Some people might believe that people’s intelligence 
can increase over time, but that not everyone’s intelligence can increase to the same 
extent. These people would hold a combination of the growth mindset and the 
nonuniversal belief. The other combinations are also possible: people may believe that 
intelligence is fixed and that only some people have high intelligence (the fixed mindset 
and the nonuniversal belief), or they may believe that everyone’s intelligence can grow 
to the same high level, implying that everyone has high intellectual potential (the growth 
mindset and the universal belief).  
Past research has provided empirical support for the above theoretical 
arguments (Rattan et al., 2012). Specifically, it found that the universal-nonuniversal 
belief and the fixed-growth mindsets are only moderately or weakly correlated. Further, 
these two beliefs at times predicted different types of outcomes. The more people 
believed that intelligence can grow over time, and the more they viewed intellectual 
potential as universal, the more they supported providing greater educational resources 
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to all students. However, the beliefs diverged in whether they predicted people’s support 
for rectifying inequity. People who believed that intelligence can grow over time were 
not more likely to support reducing inequity in the distribution of educational funds by 
taking resources from more affluent schools and giving to poorer schools, presumably 
because they did not want to sacrifice one group’s growth for another’s. However, 
people who believed that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential supported 
redistributing educational resources more equitably across communities. Although past 
work has distinguished fixed-growth mindsets and universal-nonuniversal beliefs both 
theoretically and empirically, we also test the role of fixed-growth mindsets in the current 
work. 
Overview of Studies 
We present three studies testing our hypotheses. Study 1 tested whether the 
more people believe that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential (the universal 
belief), the more likely they are to construe education as a fundamental right. Study 2 
assessed whether people who view education as a right, engendered by a more 
universal belief about intellectual potential, are more likely to support public education. 
Specifically, we tested three dimensions of people’s support for public education: how 
opposed they are to reducing the public’s investment in education, how concerned they 
are about US students’ poor education outcomes, and how much they support 
redistributing resources more equitably across wealthier and poorer communities. 
Supplementing these correlational studies with an experimental design, Study 3 
assessed whether, compared to people exposed to the idea that only some people have 
high intellectual potential, those exposed to the idea that nearly everyone has high 
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intellectual potential would be more likely to view education as a right, which would 
predict increased support for continued public investment in education and greater 
concern about students’ poor educational outcomes.  
Study 1  
 Study 1 tested our core prediction that the more people believe that nearly 
everyone has high intellectual potential, the more they would view education as a 
fundamental right.  
Method 
 Participants. As this was the first study measuring the right to education, we did 
not have any basis for conducting a power analysis. Therefore, we decided on a sample 
size of 200. A survey seeking 200 US residents was posted on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. In response, 201 participants (90 women, 111 men; mean age 37.43 years; all US 
residents) completed the survey.  
 Measures. We assessed people’s universal-nonuniversal lay belief and their 
fixed-growth mindset using Rattan et al.’s (2012, Study 2) measures. To ensure that all 
participants had a common understanding of intelligence, we first told them, “Think 
about intelligence, which means people’s general ability to reason, plan, solve 
problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from 
experience.”  
To measure the universal-nonuniversal belief, we asked participants, “Do you 
believe that almost all people have the potential to become highly intelligent at some 
point in their life, or that only some people have the potential to become highly 
intelligent?” Participants responded on a scale ranging from the universal belief, 1 = 
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“Almost all people have the potential to become highly intelligent,” to the nonuniversal 
belief, 20 = “Only some people have the potential to become highly intelligent.”  
To measure the fixed-growth mindset, we asked participants, “In general, how 
much do you think people can improve their intelligence over time? Do you believe that 
people can improve their intelligence a lot over time, or that people cannot improve their 
intelligence a lot over time?” Participants responded on a 20-point scale ranging from 
the fixed mindset, 1 = “Intelligence cannot be changed much over time,” to the growth 
mindset, 20 = “Intelligence can be changed a lot over time.” 
 To assess the extent to which participants viewed education as a right, we asked 
participants to indicate their level of agreement with five items (e.g., “All children have a 
right to have access to the highest quality of education possible”; “The right to the 
highest quality of education possible is as basic a human right as the right to free 
speech”). Participants responded on a 6-point scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to 
“Strongly agree.”  
 Participants then completed a demographic questionnaire, in which we assessed 
their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from “Very conservative” to “Very 
liberal.” Participants were also asked, “Did you encounter any technical problems during 
the survey?” (see Savani & Rattan, 2012). Following a pre-determined criterion applied 
consistently across all studies, 14 participants who selected “Yes” in response to this 
question were excluded prior to the analyses. 
Results  
 To increase ease of interpretation, we reverse-coded the universal-nonuniversal 
belief measure such that higher numbers indicated a more universal belief. We then 
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standardized both the universal-nonuniversal and the fixed-growth measures to range 
from 0 to 1. The five items measuring construal of education as a right were highly 
intercorrelated, α=.91, and thus were averaged. Table S1 presents the means, standard 
deviations, and correlations among all study variables (see Supplementary Materials).  
We first ran a regression with participants’ construal of education as a right as 
the dependent variable, and their two beliefs about intelligence as predictors. As 
hypothesized, the more people believed that everyone has high intellectual potential, 
the more they construed education as a basic right, B = .80, 95% CI = [.25, 1.35], SE = 
.28, t(184) = 2.88, p = .004. Participants’ beliefs about whether intelligence is fixed or 
can grow did not predict the extent to which they viewed education as a right, B = .34, 
95% CI = [-.29, .97], SE = .32, t(184) = 1.06, p = .29. 
Given that participants’ political ideology may relate to their support for public 
investment in education, we ran another regression adding political orientation as a third 
predictor. As a number of participants did not respond to the political orientation 
question, the effective sample size dropped from 187 to 124. Participants’ universal 
belief significantly predicted the extent to which they viewed education as a right, B = 
.73, 95% CI = [.11, 1.34], SE = .31, t(120) = 2.33, p = .02. Participants’ political 
orientation was also a significant predictor, with more liberal participants more likely to 
view education as a right, B = .20, 95% CI = [.11, .29], SE = .045, t(120) = 4.51, p < 
.001. Controlling for political orientation and with the smaller sample, the fixed-growth 
mindsets became a significant predictor, such that the more participants believed that 
intelligence can grow, the more they viewed education as a right, B = .81, 95% CI = 
[.16, 1.47], SE = .33, t(120) = 2.47, p = .02.  
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Discussion 
Study 1 supported our key hypothesis that the more people believed that 
everyone has high intellectual potential, the more they viewed education as a basic 
right. To our knowledge, this study is the first to identify a general belief underlying 
people’s views of education as a fundamental human right. Participants’ beliefs about 
the universality of intellectual potential predicted whether they construed education as a 
right above and beyond both their beliefs about the malleability of intelligence and their 
political ideology. Participants’ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence were 
associated with their construal of education as a right only after controlling for their 
political ideology. As this was not an expected pattern of results, we assessed 
participants’ fixed-growth mindsets again in Study 2 to test whether this finding is 
robust.   
Study 2  
The goal of Study 2 was to replicate Study 1’s finding that people who believe 
that everyone has high intellectual potential are more likely to view education as a right, 
as well as to test whether people who view education as a right are more likely to 
support public education. To operationalize support for public education, we 
investigated people’s support for continuing the public’s investment in education, and 
their concern when confronted with the finding that students in the nation are performing 
poorly academically compared to peer nations. In addition, we also tested whether 
people who view education as a right would be more likely to support redistributing 
educational funds equitably across wealthier and poorer school districts, which was 
studied in past research (Rattan et al., 2012). Finally, we measured participants’ other 
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beliefs and motivations that might be potentially related to their view of education as a 
right and their support for public education, including protestant work ethic (Mirels & 
Garrett, 1971), belief in meritocracy (Davey, Bobocel, Hing & Zanna, 1999), social 
dominance orientation (Sidanius, Levin, Liu & Pratto, 2000; Ho et al., 2012), system 
justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), color blindness (Knowles, Lowery, Hogan & Chow, 
2009), belief in free will (Paulhus & Margesson, 1994), and distributive justice (Kluegel 
& Smith, 1986).  
Method 
 Participants. A power analysis based on the correlation between participants’ 
universal-nonuniversal beliefs about intellectual potential and their construal of 
education as a right in Study 1 (r = -.273), α = .05, indicated that we need a sample size 
of 103 to have 80% power to detect a significant correlation. However, to ensure high 
power, we decided on a larger sample size of 400. A survey seeking 400 US residents 
was posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. In response, 412 participants completed the 
survey. Of these, we only included 408 participants who indicated that they were US 
residents (222 women, 184 men, 2 unreported; mean age 35.54 years).  
 Measures. To assess whether Study 1’s finding is robust, instead of using 
single-items to measure participants’ beliefs about intelligence, we measured 
participants’ universal-nonuniversal beliefs using a 4-item measure taken from Rattan et 
al. (2012, Study 6; sample item: “Everyone has the potential to become very intelligent if 
they really want to”). We measured their fixed-growth mindsets using a 4-item measure 
taken from Dweck (2000; sample item: “To be honest, people can’t really change how 
intelligent they are”). We measured the extent to which participants viewed education as 
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a right using the same 5-item measure as in Study 1. Participants responded to these 
three measures on a 6-point scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.”  
To assess participants’ support for continued public investment in education, we 
asked them to indicate their agreement or disagreement with four policies that reduce 
the public’s financial contribution to public education (e.g., allowing parents who send 
their children to private schools to not pay property taxes that support local public 
schools; limiting property taxes to families with children rather than to the entire 
community). Participants responded on a 6-point scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” 
to “Strongly agree.” 
To assess participants’ concern with students’ relatively poor academic 
performance, we presented them with eight factually correct statistics comparing the US 
to other OECD nations (taken from OECD 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). Sample items 
include: (1) “Recent statistics show that the US ranks 21 out of the 30 richest countries 
in the world in terms of the average number of years of education that citizens receive. 
(Citizens of Australia and the United Kingdom have on average 4 more years of 
education than American citizens);” and (2) “Recent statistics show that the US ranks 25 
out of the 30 richest countries in the world in terms of high school students' mathematics 
knowledge. (In other words, high school students in 24 of the 30 richest countries have 
more math knowledge than American students.)” After each statistic, participants were 
asked, “How disturbed are you by this information?” and responded on a 7-point scale 
ranging from “Not at all disturbed” to “Extremely disturbed.”  
Finally, we measured participants’ support for redistributing public education 
funds more equitably across wealthier and poorer school districts using the four-item 
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measure from Rattan et al. (2012, Study 6). Participants responded on a 6-point scale 
ranging from “Strongly oppose” to “Strongly support.” 
We also measured other beliefs and motivations about people’s tendency to 
legitimize inequality and to support the existing system, which could be related to their 
beliefs about intellectual potential, their view of education as a right, or their support for 
public education: protestant work ethic1 (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), belief in meritocracy 
(Davey et al., 1999), social dominance orientation (Sidanius et al., 2000; Ho et al., 
2012), system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), color blindness (Knowles et al., 2009), 
belief in free will (Paulhus & Margesson, 1994), and distributive justice (Kluegel & 
Smith, 1986). Participants responded to these measures on a 6-point scale ranging 
from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” 
 Participants also completed a demographic questionnaire, in which we assessed 
their political orientation on three items with 7-point scales ranging from “Very 
conservative” to “Very liberal,” “Very right” to “Very left,” and “Very Republican” to “Very 
Democratic.” As in Study 1, participants were also asked, “Did you encounter any 
technical problems during the survey?” Following a pre-determined criterion applied 
consistently across all studies, eight participants who selected “Yes” in response to this 
question were dropped prior to the analyses.2 
Results 
 Table S2 presents the internal reliabilities, means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for all study variables (see Supplementary Materials).  
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs). We conducted a series of CFAs to test 
whether the six key variables of interest represent distinct constructs. The initial CFAs 
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tested whether the key independent variable—universal-nonuniversal belief about 
intellectual potential—was distinct from the fixed-growth mindsets about intelligence and 
the putative mediator, construal of education as a right. Two nested CFAs indicated that 
a two-factor model fits the universal-nonuniversal belief and fixed-growth mindsets 
measures (RMSEA = .117, CFI = .964, χ2(df = 19) = 121.09) better than a one-factor 
model (RMSEA = .252, CFI = .826, χ2(df = 20) = 517.05, ∆χ2(df = 1) = 395.96, p < 
.0001). Further, a two-factor model fits the universal-nonuniversal belief and education 
as a right measures (RMSEA = .086, CFI = .962, χ2(df = 26) = 102.18) better than a 
one-factor model (RMSEA = .313, CFI = .474, χ2(df = 27) = 1069.53, ∆χ2(df = 1) = 
967.35, p < .0001).  
We next tested whether the mediator was distinct from each of the three 
dependent measures. Nested CFAs found that a two-factor model fits the education as 
a right and support for continued public investment in education measures (RMSEA = 
.047, CFI = .983, χ2(df = 26) = 48.) better than a one-factor model (45RMSEA = .154, 
CFI = .812, χ2(df = 27) = 277.88, ∆χ2(df = 1) = 229.43, p < .0001). Similarly, a two-factor 
model fits the education as a right and concern with students’ poor educational 
outcomes (RMSEA = .133, CFI = .888, χ2(df = 64) = 496.05) better than a one-factor 
model (RMSEA = .233, CFI = .641, χ2(df = 65) = 1414.85, ∆χ2(df = 1) = 918.80, p < 
.0001). Further, a two-factor model fits the education as a right and support for 
redistributing public education funds more equitably measures (RMSEA = .067, CFI = 
.968, χ2(df = 26) = 72.35) better than a one-factor model (RMSEA = .136, CFI = .866, 
χ2(df = 27) = 222.65, ∆χ2(df = 1) = 150.30, p < .0001). 
The final set of CFAs found that a three-factor model fits the three dependent 
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measures—continued public investment in education, concern with students’ poor 
educational outcomes, and redistributing public education funds (RMSEA = .111, CFI = 
.863, χ2(df = 101) = 578.72)—better than a one-factor model (RMSEA = .158, CFI = 
.713, χ2(df = 104) = 1102.02, ∆χ2(df = 3) = 523.30, p < .0001). Thus, the CFAs indicated 
that the constructs measured are distinct components of support for public education. 
Structural equation model. We next ran a structural equation model with three 
independent variables (participants’ universal-nonuniversal beliefs, fixed-growth 
mindsets, and political orientation), predicting the mediator (view of education as a 
right), and the mediator and political orientation predicting the three outcome variables 
(participants’ support for reducing public investment in education, their concern with the 
poor educational outcomes, and their support for redistributing public education funds 
more equitably). Covariances among the three independent variables and among the 
three dependent variables were estimated. Figure 1 presents the results of the SEM 
model. The model had good fit, RMSEA = .061, CFI = .975, SRMR = .028, χ2(df = 6) = 
14.99, p = .02. 
<Insert Figure 1> 
As predicted, the more participants believed that everyone has high intellectual 
potential, the more they viewed education as a right, β = .17, 95% CI [.05, .30], p = .006. 
However, participants’ beliefs about whether intelligence is fixed or can grow were 
unrelated to their view of education as right, β = .0027, 95% CI [-.12, .13], p = .97. As 
hypothesized, participants who viewed education as more of a right were more opposed 
to reducing public investment in education, β = -.21, 95% CI [-.31, -.11], p < .001, were 
more concerned about students’ poor academic performance, β = .31, 95% CI [.22, .41], 
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p < .001, and more strongly supported redistributing public education funds equitably 
between wealthier and poorer school districts, β = .36, 95% CI [.28, .45], p < .001.  
Alternate models. We next ran seven additional SEMs in which we added one 
of the seven additional variables measured (protestant work ethic, belief in meritocracy, 
social dominance orientation, system justification, color blindness, belief in free will, and 
distributive justice) both as a predictor of education as a right and as a predictor of the 
three outcome variables. The primary effects of interest, that is, the effect of universal-
nonuniversal beliefs on education as a right, and the effects of education as a right on 
the three dependent variables, stayed significant in all seven models, p’s < .05. Table 
S3 presents the results of the additional seven models (see Supplementary Materials). 
Tests of indirect effects. We next used the bootstrapping approach outlined by 
Preacher and Hayes (2004) to test for indirect effects of universal-nonuniversal beliefs 
on each of the dependent measures through construal of education as a right. We 
controlled for participants’ fixed-growth mindsets and political orientation in these 
analyses to be consistent with the SEM model reported previously. With reference to 
support for reducing public investment in education, a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 
iterations indicated that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect 
(standardized indirect effect = -.04) excluded zero, [-.08, -.01]. Similarly, with reference 
to concern with students’ poor academic outcomes, a bootstrap analysis (with 5,000 
iterations) indicated that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect 
effect (standardized indirect effect = .06) excluded zero, [.02, .11]. Finally, with 
reference to support for redistributing public education funds equitably, a bootstrap 
analysis (with 5,000 iterations) indicated that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
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for the indirect effect (standardized indirect effect = .05) excluded zero, [.01, .09]. These 
results offer additional support for indirect effects of the universal-nonuniversal beliefs 
on the three outcome variables through participants’ view of education as a right. 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the main finding of Study 1: the more people believed that 
everyone has high intellectual potential, the more likely they were to view education as 
a right. In turn, the more people viewed education as a right, the more they opposed 
reducing the public’s investment in education and the more concerned they were about 
students’ poor academic performance. Further, we found that the previously 
documented relationship between people’s beliefs about the universality of intellectual 
potential and their support for redistributing public education funds more equitably was 
mediated through their construal of education as a right. These relationships held even 
after controlling for a number of beliefs and motivations related to people’s tendency to 
legitimize inequality and to support the existing system: protestant work ethic, belief in 
meritocracy, social dominance orientation, system justification, color blindness, belief in 
free will, and distributive justice. 
Notably, the hypothesized relationships were significant even after controlling for 
participants’ beliefs about whether intelligence is fixed or can grow, and their political 
ideology. Unlike Study 1, we did not find any significant effects of participants’ fixed-
growth mindsets even after controlling for their political ideology, suggesting that the 
finding from Study 1 was not consistent across samples.  
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 provided correlational evidence for our core hypotheses. The 
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goal of Study 3 was to provide experimental evidence for the idea that people’s beliefs 
about whether everyone or not everyone has high intellectual potential exert a causal 
influence on the extent to which they view education as a right. In addition, we sought to 
address a potential limitation of the previous studies. In the earlier studies, our measure 
of education as a right could be perceived as leading, given that all items were framed 
as advocating the idea of a right to education, thus potentially conveying to participants 
that the researchers wanted them to indicate that they think of education as a right. To 
address this potential issue, we revised the measure of right to education in the current 
study to frame all items in the negative, such that all items stated that people do not 
have a right to education.  
Method 
 Participants. We conducted a power analysis based on an effect size of 
Cohen’s d = .56, taken from Rattan et al. (2012, Study 4) which manipulated 
participants’ universal-nonuniversal beliefs and examined their support for redistributing 
public education funds. A sample size of 104 was needed to have 80% power to detect 
a significant effect with α = .05. However, to ensure high power, we decided on a larger 
sample size of 400. A survey seeking 400 US residents was posted on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. In response, 433 participants completed the survey. Of these, we only 
included 429 participants who indicated that they were US residents (246 women, 183 
men; mean age 33.96 years).  
Manipulation. To manipulate whether participants believed that nearly everyone 
or only some people have high intellectual potential, we used the “news article” 
methodology that has often been used to manipulate people’s beliefs about the 
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malleability of human characteristics (e.g., Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Rattan & 
Dweck, 2010). Specifically, we asked participants to read articles (approximately 400 
words long) that described “scientific research” arguing that either nearly everyone or 
only some people have high intellectual potential (see Supplementary Materials). To 
increase readability of the article to an online audience, we divided the article into seven 
paragraphs, and presented each paragraph on a separate screen. After participants 
read the article, we asked them to summarize the main point of the article in 2-3 
sentences. In addition, after three filler questions, we also asked participants, “How 
much do you agree with the main point communicated by the article?” Participants 
responded on a 7-point scale ranging from “Not at all” to “Extremely.” 
External manipulation check. In an external manipulation check, we randomly 
assigned 99 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to read either the 
universal article or the nonuniversal article. We then administered the single item 
measure of the universal-nonuniversal belief and the single item measure of the fixed-
growth mindsets used in Study 1. We reverse coded the universal-nonuniversal 
measure such that higher numbers indicated greater agreement with the universal 
belief. We found that participants in the universal article condition were more likely to 
agree with the universal belief, M = 11.50, SD = 6.19, than those in the nonuniversal 
article condition, M = 8.90, SD = 4.94, t(97) = 2.31, p = .023. However, participants in 
the universal article condition, M = 13.63, SD = 5.47, and the nonuniversal article 
condition, M = 13.12, SD = 4.40, did not significantly differ in their fixed-growth 
mindsets, t(97) = .51, p = .61. Therefore, our experimental manipulation influenced the 
targeted universal-nonuniversal belief but not the fixed-growth mindsets. 
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Measures. After participants read the article, we presented them with a new 
scale measuring education as a right (sample item: “The costs of providing the highest 
quality education to all students would be too prohibitive”). All items in this scale were 
reverse-scored so that higher numbers indicated greater agreement with the right to 
education. Participants then completed the measures of support for reducing public 
investment in education and concern with students’ poor academic outcomes used in 
Study 2. 
 Participants also completed a demographic questionnaire, in which we assessed 
their political orientation on three 7-point scales ranging from “Very conservative” to 
“Very liberal,” “Very right” to “Very left,” and “Very Republican” to “Very Democratic.” As 
in Study 1, participants were also asked, “Did you encounter any technical problems 
during the survey?” Following a pre-determined criterion applied consistently across all 
studies, 14 participants who selected “Yes” in response to this question or did not 
answer this question were dropped prior to the analyses.  
Results 
Table S4 presents the means, standard deviations, scale alphas, and 
correlations among all study variables (see Supplementary Materials). The extent to 
which participants agreed with the main point communicated by the article used in the 
manipulation did not significantly differ across conditions, MNonuniversal = 4.34, SD = 1.69, 
MUniversal = 4.09, SD = 1.86, t(412) = 1.43, p = .15. However, to control for common 
method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), and to be consistent with 
past research (Rattan et al., 2012), we controlled for participants’ agreement with the 
article used in the manipulation in the following analyses.3 
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We analyzed the data using a structural equation modelling. The model tested 
whether participants’ experimental condition, their agreement with the article, and their 
political orientation predicted the extent to which they viewed education as a right; and 
whether participants’ political orientation and the extent to which they construed 
education as a right predicted their support for reducing public investment in education 
and their concern for students’ poor academic outcomes. Figure 2 presents the results 
of the SEM model, which had acceptable fit, RMSEA = .067, CFI = .959, SRMR = .032, 
χ2(df = 5) = 14.42, p = .013. There was a significant effect of the experimental 
manipulation: participants randomly assigned to read the article claiming that everyone 
has high intellectual potential were more likely to view education as a right than those 
randomly assigned to read the article claiming that only some people have high 
intellectual potential, β = .32, 95% CI [.067, .58], p = .013. Further, the more participants 
viewed education as a right, the less they supported reducing public investment in 
education, β = -.26, 95% CI [-.33, -.19], p < .001, and the more concerned they were 
about learning about students’ poor educational outcomes, β = .18, 95% CI [.077, .28], p 
= .001. 
<Insert Figure 2> 
We next compared this model against an alternate model in which view of 
education as a right was treated as an outcome variable rather than a mediator. The 
resulting model had worse fit, RMSEA = .218, CFI = .742, SRMR = .064, χ2(df = 3) = 
61.77, p < .001, ∆χ2(df = 2) = 47.35, p < .001. Therefore, the mediation model was 
superior to the non-mediational model.  
In a third model, we tested whether there are direct effects of people’s beliefs 
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about intellectual potential on the two outcome variables (support for reducing public 
investment in education and their concern for students’ poor academic outcomes), but 
did not find these to be significant, p’s > .60. This model had worse fit than the original 
model without direct effects, RMSEA = .094, CFI = .952, SRMR = .031, χ2(df = 3) = 
13.98, p = .003, ∆χ2(df = 2) = .44, p = .20. 
We next used the bootstrapping approach outlined by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) to test for indirect effects of the experimental manipulation on the two outcomes 
through viewing education as a right. We controlled for participants’ political orientation 
and their agreement with the article presented in the manipulation to be consistent with 
the SEM model reported previously. With reference to support for reducing public 
investment in education, a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 iterations indicated that the 
95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect (standardized indirect 
effect = -.09) excluded zero, [-.17, -.02]. Similarly, with reference to concern with 
students’ poor academic outcomes, a bootstrap analysis (with 5,000 iterations) 
indicated that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect 
(standardized indirect effect = .06) excluded zero, [.01, .15]. These results offer support 
for indirect effects of the universal-nonuniversal manipulation on the two outcome 
variables through participants’ view of education as a right. 
Discussion 
 Study 3 provided experimental evidence for the key idea that compared to people 
exposed to the idea that only some individuals have high intellectual potential, those 
exposed to the idea that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential were more likely 
to construe education as a fundamental right. People who were more likely to view 
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education as a right, in turn, were more opposed to reducing public investment in 
education and were more concerned about students’ poor academic outcomes.  
General Discussion 
 Three studies supported the hypothesis that people’s beliefs about the 
universality of intellectual potential underlie their position on education. Study 1 found 
that the more people believed that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential (a 
universal belief) the more they viewed education as a basic right. Study 2 replicated this 
relationship and found that the more people viewed education as a right, the more they 
supported continued public investment in education, the more concerned they were 
upon learning that students in the US were performing worse academically than 
students in peer nations, and the more they supported redistributing public education 
funding more equitably across wealthier and poorer school districts. Study 3 provided 
experimental evidence for the link between people’s universal-nonuniversal beliefs and 
their view of education as a right, and found significant indirect effects of people’s 
universal-nonuniversal beliefs on their continued public investment in education and 
their concern about students’ poor academic outcomes through their view of education 
as a right. 
Implications and Future Directions 
Empirical research in psychology has examined factors that affect whether 
individuals and groups value education (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2006; Sue & Okazaki, 
1990). Other research has attempted to explain nations’ commitment to education 
based on ecological differences, such as the availability of natural resources (Gylfason, 
2001). To our knowledge, no empirical social psychological research has previously 
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examined the psychological factors underlying whether people view education as a 
right. Thus, the current studies provide the first investigation of what determines 
whether people view education as a basic right for all members of society.  
 Citizen’s support for education as a fundamental right is particularly critical given 
the far-reaching consequences of education for both individuals and nations. For 
example, average academic achievement across a national population predicts the 
earnings of the average resident, the distribution of income within the nation, and the 
nation’s subsequent economic growth (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008, 2012). 
Therefore, to the degree that nations want to increase their competitiveness in the 
global marketplace, economic arguments alone would recommend increased support 
for residents’ education. However, our findings suggest that the public might not support 
education as much if they hold a more nonuniversal belief about intellectual potential. 
Our findings also suggest that people’s beliefs about whether nearly everyone or only 
some people have high intellectual potential can be shaped, and this raises the 
possibility that messages about intelligence as universal versus nonuniversal may be an 
important, but to date overlooked, component of representations and discourses about 
education.  
 We must note that the studies reported here were only conducted with 
participants from the US. The dependent measures investigated were also US-specific, 
such as concern with the US students’ poor educational outcomes compared to 
students from other industrialized countries. Given that past research already shows 
cross-cultural variance in people’s universal-nonuniversal lay beliefs (Rattan et al., 
2012), we suggest that future research can investigate whether the same pattern of 
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findings holds with people in other countries, including countries that similarly have a 
long tradition of free and compulsory public education (e.g., Germany) and ones in 
which public education is a more recent phenomenon (e.g., South Korea). It may be that 
these lay beliefs serve as predictors of education policy only in nations in which the 
question of public education as a fundamental right is being debated, and not in nations 
where recent consensus has been achieved about education as a right.  
 All three studies found that people who believed that only some individuals have 
high intellectual potential were less likely to view education as a fundamental right. 
Does this mean that people with a nonuniversal belief simply do not care about 
education? We speculate that everyone, irrespective of their lay theories about 
intellectual potential, believes that individuals with intellectual potential should receive 
quality education. However, people with a nonuniversal perspective are more likely than 
those with a universal perspective to believe that only those individuals who possess 
high intellectual potential should receive a good quality education, not those who do not 
possess intellectual potential. Therefore, people with a nonuniversal belief might not 
view education as a fundamental right for everyone, but as a resource that needs to be 
provided first and foremost to individuals who possess intellectual potential. Future 
research can test these ideas explicitly. 
Do universal-nonuniversal beliefs influence people’s actual behavior? We found 
relationships between people’s beliefs about intellectual potential and their attitudinal 
support for public education, such as continuing the public’s investment in education, 
and reducing inequity in the amount of public education funds that different school 
districts receive. Future research should bridge the attitude-behavior gap by 
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investigating whether people’s beliefs about intellectual potential influence their 
behavior, such as whether they vote for budget proposals to increase funding for public 
education or to redistribute educational funds across school districts.  
Although the present research examined people’s view of education as a right as 
the mechanism explaining the link between their universal-nonuniversal beliefs about 
intellectual potential and their support for public education, future research can also 
investigate complementary explanations that might be derived from a motivated 
cognition perspective. For example, perhaps people who believe that only some people 
have high intellectual potential are less concerned about students’ poor educational 
outcomes because these facts support their lay theory (i.e., if not everyone has 
potential, then not everyone will succeed academically). In contrast, people who believe 
that nearly everyone has high intellectual potential might be more concerned because 
these facts contradict their universal beliefs (i.e., if everyone has high potential, then 
something must be wrong if students are not succeeding academically). Future 
research can examine the motivational dynamics accompanying people’s universal vs. 
nonuniversal beliefs about intellectual potential. 
Researchers have often connected people’s support for social policies with 
system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994), the idea that people are motivated to defend 
the current sociopolitical system. One might ask whether the current findings can be 
explained from a system justification perspective. Taken together, the outcome 
variables that we examined in the present research suggest not. We find that people 
who view education as a right supported continuing public investment in education, 
which indicates support for the current system. However, we also find that these people 
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were more concerned about students’ poor academic outcomes and wanted to rectify 
existing inequity in how public education funds are allocated, which indicates a desire to 
address faults with the system. Thus, we find that the same view of education yielded 
system-justifying and system-critical outlooks simultaneously. Traditional approaches to 
the study of system justification focus on situational factors that lead people to support 
versus undermine the system, and therefore, we believe, cannot fully explain the current 
set of results. The intersection of system justification beliefs and lay beliefs about 
intellectual potential might be a fruitful area for future theory and research to explore. 
The current research raises the question of whether nearly all students do, in 
fact, have high intellectual potential. To our knowledge, no scientific consensus yet 
exists. However, extensive research indicates that with sufficient and appropriate 
practice, a large proportion of people can become high achievers in a given domain. A 
landmark study identified intensive training and perseverance, not precocious signs of 
talent or intelligence, as a common characteristic of 120 elite performers in diverse 
fields, such as science, sports, and the arts, (Bloom, 1985). Additionally, evidence from 
high achievers in a number of domains, such as mental multiplication and chess, has 
led other researchers to conclude, “counter to the common belief that expert 
performance reflects innate abilities and capacities, … expert performance is 
predominantly mediated by acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations” that 
are gained through deliberate, sustained, challenging practice (Ericsson & Charness, 
1994, p. 725; see also Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993; but 
see Macnamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014, for an alternate view). Scholars have also 
weighed in on the issue of who can benefit from high quality schooling, an issue central 
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to the current research, and some have concluded that in terms of intellectual ability, 
“most students, perhaps over 90 percent, can master what teachers have to teach 
them” (Bloom, 1968, p.1; see also Bloom 1974, 1984; Carroll, 1963, 1989). If a large 
proportion of individuals can acquire complex knowledge and skills based on effort, 
good strategies, and quality instruction, then intellectual potential may be relatively more 
universal than previously considered.  
Conclusion 
 Fundamental rights are not defined only by history and tradition; they are also the 
subject of fierce debate in the here-and-now. This makes it essential for scientific 
research to develop a deeper understanding of the factors that determine which rights 
people consider to be fundamental rights that should be guaranteed to all.  
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Figure 1.  SEM model in Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p<0.001 (two-tailed)
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Figure 2.  SEM model in Study 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p<0.001 (two-tailed)
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Footnote 
 
1 Three reverse-coded items from the original scale were not included in the study 
because reverse-coded items tend to load on a different factor than non-reverse coded 
items (Swain, Weathers & Niedrich, 2008) 
2 This study contained an additional measure tapping construal of education as a scarce 
resource (see Supplementary Materials). 
3 The effective sample size dropped from 415 to 414 when participants’ agreement with 
the article was included in the regression analysis as one participant did not indicate the 
extent to which they agreed with the article. 
 
